Upset Landslide in the Philly Mayoral:
How Michael Nutter went from hopeless to the Next Great Hope

The Way Things Were
While it’s often called the ‘City of Brotherly Love”, Philadelphia’s Mayoral primaries are often anything but brotherly. Politics in Philly is a contact sport; punches are rarely pulled and deep racial divisions are par for the course.

In 1999, a bruising multi-candidate primary led to the election of current Mayor John Street. Though he was re-elected easily in 2003, his terms in office were marred by crime and corruption. Now term-limited, the race to succeed him was largely about reforming the way the city had run under Street and doing more to rid Philadelphia neighborhoods of epidemic gun violence.

When the race began, it was expected to be a coronation more than a contest, as Congressman Chakah Fattah started with a double-digit lead and was widely regarded as an unbeatable frontrunner. The field was shaken up early on with the entry of multi-millionaire Tom Knox who made no secret of his willingness to liberally spend millions of his vast personal fortune to “buy City Hall back for the people of Philadelphia.”

Rounding out the field were two highly-regarded candidates, each possessing a unique and substantial geographic (and fundraising) base. Congressman Bob Brady was not only the Democratic Party Chair of the City, but he was a hero to organized labor in Philadelphia. And State Representative Dwight Evans was the Chairman of the State House Appropriations Committee and would surely draw strength from his base, not to mention money from his position.

Then there was Michael Nutter.
A former City Councilman, Nutter had given up his seat to run for Mayor. Conventional thinking was that relinquishing the position would undermine Nutter's ability to raise money for the race, but it ended up allowing Nutter to focus his efforts squarely on winning the nomination. Nutter's council district gave him a geographic base (albeit smaller than Brady's or Fattah's) but his campaign would be the only one to have to raise the money without the benefits of either incumbency or vast personal wealth. And, unlike Brady or Fattah, he would also have to run without the support of the Ward leaders and other insiders, historically a prerequisite to winning in Philladelphia.

Nutter quickly and quietly assembled a campaign team of pros, each of whom brought unique assets to the effort. Bill Hyers, an experienced and savvy campaign professional, was coming off one of 2006's biggest Democratic wins in the House. Bill's campaign experience, coupled with his military background, would give the team the strength and discipline it needed to withstand the temptation to squander resources and instead devise and implement a successful, full-term strategy.

Neil Oxman and JJ Balaban of the Campaign Group were brought in as media consultants and Fred Yang was brought in to do the polling. Oxman and his team are Philadelphia natives who helped elect Wilson Goode in 1979 and Ed Rendell in 1991. They are no strangers to winning in Philly, and the strategy they devised showed why.

Timing Is Everything
Knox began running broadcast television ads in the middle of December. His financial advantage made him the likely beneficiary of a long war, and although his ads might not have been optimumly effective during the holiday season, communicating in a vacuum during that period and throughout January definitely had an effect. Knox ascended the polls. In low single digits and a distant 5 th place when he announced, he had the airwaves all to himself and quickly forged himself into a force in this race.

One can reasonably assume that the Knox campaign wanted other candidates to chase him onto television and drain their own, more limited resources. Evans, Brady and Fattah did exactly that.

Michael Nutter, on the other hand, watched, waited and raised money until he had enough to go up on television at significant and sustainable point levels. While saving money until the end of a campaign and making sure you can stay up when you go up is Campaign Strategy 101, the other candidates' failure to follow this basic premise ended up giving Nutter a distinct advantage down the stretch.

Game On
Nutter's T.V. buy began on March 25 th with an ad criticizing the way Mayor Street had run the city. The strategy Neil Oxman had devised required that we do something right out of the box to shake up the race and begin the process of branding Nutter as the anti-Street candidate.

Some observers questioned the unconventional strategy of beginning a campaign by attacking someone not on the ballot, but the ad helped draw the battle lines and gained the attention Nutter needed, and which he had so far not been getting.

Knox, meanwhile, had taken the lead over Fattah and was consistently hovering in the mid 20's in all public polling. Brady, after an initial burst when he first announced, wasn't gaining any steam and Fattah's campaign seemed virtually non-existent. Fattah curiously seemed to be running a rose garden strategy. The trouble was that he hadn't won anything yet and was failing to raise the money or inspire the confidence of voters. Evans' small media buy got him some early press buzz, but failed to move the dial in his favor to any extent.

Meanwhile, the Nutter campaign continued to raise money, dominate the field at public events and fly largely under the radar as the press and insiders continued to doubt his ability to draw vote share.

No one doubted Nutter's command of the issues, however; he was widely regarded as the wonk in the field. The missing ingredient was warmth, as voters and insiders alike knew of Michael's mastery of the issues but up until this point had not seen another side of him.

The now famous "Olivia" ad where Michael's daughter touted her father's strengths helped change that. The ad created buzz, and movement in the polls after that was nothing short of meteoric.

While the campaign continued to gain momentum on television, print ads in The Inquirer and the Daily News were used to reinforce Nutter's credentials to the Center City liberals who would ultimately form the core of his support. We knew these ads would have little persuasive value, but would help sustain our ever-increasing momentum and complement our electronic strategy. The polls had announced Nutter's arrival in the race; we had to make sure everyone knew he was there.

When the campaign got polling results back in late April, Michael had closed Knox's lead to single digits, but Fattah remained a serious and significant threat to Nutter's prospects. Each drew 19 percent of the black vote and both were viewed very favorably by this portion of the electorate.

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